Zhong Xue Gao's ¥66 'Pink Diamond' sells out in 15h, launching premium Chinese ice cream

In 2018 Chinese ice cream was a low-price street business — a stick had cost about ¥1 for fifteen years — while Häagen-Dazs and other foreign brands owned the premium tier. Ad man Lin Sheng, who had already turned Modier and Zhongjie 1946 into viral ice-cream brands, founded Zhong Xue Gao in March 2018 and needed a way to make a new, high-priced Chinese brand famous fast.

Make 'expensive' the message: one ¥66 limited-edition popsicle, 20,000 units, sold online in winter on Double 11 — scarcity and price itself become the brand launch.

On Double 11 2018 the brand released its first product, the ¥66 'Ecuador Pink Diamond' (厄瓜多尔粉钻), a limited run of 20,000 pieces delivered in foam boxes packed with dry ice — an 'unboxing luxury' experience. Around it Lin Sheng built a full social machine: Xiaohongshu seeding notes, KOL reviews and livestreams, pop-up shops at Shanghai landmarks, celebrity endorsement, and a stream of cross-brand collaborations, all featuring a tile-shaped, Chinese-styled stick with a biodegradable paddle.

The 20,000 Pink Diamonds sold out in 15 hours and accounted for 10% of Tmall's ice-cream category sales that day. Zhong Xue Gao took first place in Tmall's ice-cream category on 2018 Double 11, then held the Double 11 ice-cream crown for four straight years (2018–2021), topping Häagen-Dazs in 2020. The ¥66 price itself became the story — media nicknamed the brand 'the Hermès of popsicles' — and 'expensive' became its calling card.

In March 2018, advertising veteran Lin Sheng founded Zhong Xue Gao in Shanghai — the name is a homophone for 'Chinese-style ice cream' — and designed the product as a roof-tile-shaped stick with a 'hui' pattern, a biodegradable paddle and no stabilizers. His target: a domestic premium tier that did not exist. For fifteen years a street popsicle had cost about ¥1, while high-end ice cream in China meant Häagen-Dazs and other foreign brands.

On Double 11 2018, before the brand even had a distribution network, Lin Sheng released its first product: the 'Ecuador Pink Diamond', a ¥66 limited run of 20,000 pieces sold online, shipped in foam boxes with dry ice. Around it he orchestrated Xiaohongshu seeding, KOL reviews, pop-up shops and cross-brand collaborations, making the price — absurd for a popsicle — the hook of every story.

The run sold out in 15 hours and accounted for 10% of Tmall's ice-cream category sales that day. Zhong Xue Gao finished first in Tmall's ice-cream category on 2018 Double 11 and kept the Double 11 crown for four consecutive years, topping Häagen-Dazs in 2020. The 'Hermès of popsicles' label stuck, and the launch became the template for China's marketing-led new-consumer brands.

The price was the hook: ¥66 for a popsicle was so absurd it generated coverage no paid campaign could buy, and the sell-out proved the positioning rather than just claiming it.

Scarcity did the selling: a fixed 20,000-piece run created urgency and made 'sold out in 15 hours' a permanent part of the brand story.

It picked the one battlefield with no opponents: online, in winter, at a premium price — everyone else was fighting over street-corner fridges in summer.

The product matched the story: Chinese-tile shape, a name meaning 'Chinese-style ice cream', and a biodegradable paddle gave the luxury claim a consistent identity instead of a random gimmick.

Price can be the product when a category is undervalued: one scarce, expensive item creates news, and the news establishes the positioning that the rest of the range then sells against.

The launch made Zhong Xue Gao the standard-bearer of China's marketing-led 'new consumer' brands: four straight Tmall Double 11 ice-cream crowns (2018–2021), beating Häagen-Dazs in 2020. The same high-price positioning later backfired: the 2022 'ice-cream assassin' (雪糕刺客) backlash made the brand a symbol of hidden high prices, and by late 2023 it was cutting staff and failing to pay salaries. In March 2024, 'Zhong Xue Gao price cut from ¥60 to ¥2.5' topped Weibo's hot list and the company and founder became judgment debtors — a collapse read as a cautionary tale about marketing-built brands.